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ABSTRACT 
Reality monitoring processes are necessary for discriminating between internally-generated information 
and information that originated in the outside world.  They help us identify our thoughts, feelings, and 
imaginations, and distinguish them from events we may have experienced or been told about by someone 
else.  Reality monitoring errors range from confusions between real and imagined experiences that are 
byproducts of normal cognition, to symptoms of mental illness such as hallucinations. Recent advances 
support an emerging neurocognitive characterization of reality monitoring that provides insights into its 
underlying operating principles and neural mechanisms, the differing ways in which impairment may 
occur in health and disease, and the potential for rehabilitation strategies to be devised that might help 
those who experience clinically-significant reality monitoring disruption. 
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How Do We Know What is Real? 
Thinking back over your life, you can often find yourself mentally transported back in time, re-living a 
past episode, sometimes in vivid detail. Except – how do you know that you were actually there when the 
event originally took place? How can you be sure that you are remembering a faithful representation of 
what happened, as opposed to an event you might have previously imagined, or a story told to you by 
someone else? In short, how do you determine whether your memories are real? 
 
One prominent theory, the Source Monitoring Framework, proposes that there are decision processes 
involved in making attributions about the origins of information that comes to mind, including 
discriminating information that was generated by internal cognitive functions such as thought and 
imagination from information that was derived from the outside world by perceptual processes [reality 
monitoring; 1,2].  According to this framework, memories do not contain propositional tags that directly 
specify their source.  Instead, we make attributions about the origin of a mental experience by considering 
its features in light of assumptions about the characteristics that tend to be associated with various 
sources.  For example, a person might infer that an apparent “memory” rich in visuoperceptual detail is 
likely to be real (“I can remember what the dentist’s office looked like” [3]) whereas one comprising 
mainly traces of internally-generated thoughts might instead have been imagined (“I could remember I 
had a very specific reason for making the association”; “I made the decision by knowing what my train 
of thought was during the exercise” [4]). 
 
Reality monitoring errors tend to involve misattributing internally-generated events as real, for example 
later misattributing particularly vivid imaginations to perception, or assuming that the absence of memory 
for cognitive operations indicates that a memory is unlikely to have been self-generated [4], though 
misattributions in the other direction also occur, such as in cryptomnesia [5]. Similarity between potential 
sources increases the likelihood of source errors [6].  For example, misattribution errors are more 
common for auditory than visual stimuli, perhaps because ‘inner speech’ and real speech tend to be more 
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similar than visual imagery and actual visual perceptions and, hence, more vulnerable to confusion [7].  It 
is important to note that the features that are activated when a “target” memory is cued are determined by 
processes engaged during encoding of the event (e.g., the quality of feature binding), during the interval 
between the initial event and the act of “remembering” (e.g., the number of reactivations), and during 
retrieval (e.g., the cue eliciting the memory).  Also, features from other events can be activated at any 
point, potentially influencing the characteristics of the remembered event [8].  In addition to the 
phenomenal qualities of mental experiences, reality monitoring may also involve explicit retrieval of 
supporting or conflicting information, and may be influenced by prior knowledge, beliefs, and motives 
[9].  Thus, there are multiple factors operating during encoding and retrieval, and in the intervening 
period, that can produce source misattributions in healthy individuals, and multiple ways that processes 
can be disrupted in clinical populations. 
 
In the last few years, a number of laboratories around the world have explored the brain mechanisms 
underlying reality monitoring processes using cognitive neuroscience methods like functional brain 
imaging of healthy volunteers and studies of neurological, psychiatric, and developmental disorders, as 
well as of normal aging [10]. The aim has been to understand how the brain supports our capacity to 
determine the sources of mental experiences, including distinguishing what is real from what we 
imagined, an ability that is vital for maintaining confidence in our memories, and in understanding 
ourselves as individuals in the world with a past and a future. In characterising how these processes might 
be instantiated in the brain, we can better understand the way in which they may break down in disorders 
like schizophrenia, in which a person’s relation to reality can be altered in ways that disrupt their 
everyday functioning. 
 
Anterior Prefrontal Cortex and Reality Monitoring 
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have identified a network of brain regions involved in the 
recollection of source information, which include prefrontal, medial temporal, and parietal cortices [10–
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12].  In broad terms, regions of prefrontal cortex are thought to provide cognitive control over the 
encoding and retrieval of feature representations that are bound together in a spatial frame by the 
hippocampus and further integrated by parietal cortex into a first-person perspective that supports the 
subjective experience of remembering [9,13].  The role of the prefrontal cortex appears to be particularly 
critical for source memory, with lesions to the frontal lobes typically causing severe difficulties with the 
recollection of such contextual details even when old/new item recognition is unimpaired [14,15].  
Distinct prefrontal regions may make separable functional contributions to source memory [11], with 
ventrolateral PFC sub-regions linked with the specification of retrieval cues and the maintenance of 
retrieved information, and dorsolateral PFC exhibiting activity during post-retrieval monitoring [16–18]. 
 
One region that has emerged as playing a key role in reality monitoring is anterior prefrontal cortex, an 
area right at the front of the brain that, in relative terms, is roughly twice as large in the human brain as in 
even the great apes [19]. It has lower cellular density and higher dendritic complexity than comparable 
cortical regions [20], and is thought to be among the last areas to achieve myelination [21], enabling 
nerve cells to transmit information more rapidly and facilitating more complex cognitive abilities. As 
such, although the functions performed by this area are not well understood, they have generally been 
considered likely to be among the “higher” levels of human complex cognition [21–24].  The role played 
by anterior PFC in memory has been difficult to characterize.  A number of neuroimaging experiments 
published in the early 2000s reported activation in this region during the recollection of source details 
[16,18,25,26], but this was not consistently observed [17,27,28]. An absence of anterior PFC activity 
could of course always be attributable to insufficient experimental power or to susceptibility in the fMRI 
signal due to the proximity of anterior PFC to the sinus area.  However, another hypothesis is that the 
discrepancy between studies might have arisen because the kinds of information that participants were 
being asked to remember differed according to whether it had been generated internally or externally at 
the time of encoding [29]. 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the past decade or so, this hypothesis has been tested by a number of experiments from several 
laboratories that have manipulated the recollection of internally-generated and externally-derived source 
details (Figure 1). Although there is some variability in the patterns of activity elicited by such tasks, 
these studies have consistently identified the medial aspect of anterior PFC in particular as exhibiting 
differential activity during the retrieval of internal vs. external aspects of context (Figure 2).  For 
example, medial anterior PFC responses distinguish recollection of the encoding task undertaken 
compared with remembering where on the screen [29–31] or when in time [32,33] stimuli were presented, 
or remembering their size on the screen [25,34].  The same region is involved in remembering whether 
verbal phrases were previously presented in full on the screen (e.g., “bacon and eggs”), or whether a word 
was missing which participants had to imagine (e.g., “bacon and ?”) in order to complete the phrase 
themselves [30,35].  Likewise, medial anterior PFC is differentially engaged during recollection of 
whether a visual object was previously seen or imagined by participants [36], as well as when judging 
whether oneself or another person performed a particular action with stimuli [37–39].  The sensitivity of 
this region to reality monitoring distinctions is apparent regardless of whether words, faces, or objects are 
being remembered [29,32,34,36], suggesting that the effect is independent of stimulus type.  Moreover, 
medial anterior activation has been observed irrespective of whether the ‘internal’ or ‘external’ condition 
is associated with lower recollection accuracy and longer response times or vice versa, or whether such 
behavioral factors are matched between conditions [29,32], suggesting that an account in terms of 
differential task difficulty is unlikely to be sufficient. Possible explanations of the observed activity 
include that medial anterior PFC represents records of cognitive operations involved in self-generation, or 
is involved in self-referential processing or self-representation; or that the region operates as a gateway, 
biasing attention between self-generated and externally-generated information, whether that information 
is experienced currently or in the past [21,40].  
7 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Not everybody exhibits perfect reality monitoring performance, of course.  Performance varies 
considerably even in apparently healthy individuals, with some people reliably able to distinguish 
internally- from externally-generated stimuli and others performing closer to chance levels [41].  
Consistent with the functional neuroimaging evidence discussed above, recent research points to these 
individual differences as having a specific brain structural basis in the medial PFC.  One structural 
landmark in this region of the brain that exhibits considerable morphological variability within the general 
population is the paracingulate sulcus (PCS), which lies dorsal and parallel to the cingulate sulcus (Figure 
3).  The PCS, which is prominent in roughly half of the normal population, is a tertiary sulcus, one of the 
last structural folds to develop before birth and, due to a combination of genetic and environmental 
influences, varies considerably in size between individuals [42].  This brain structure variation appears to 
be linked to reality monitoring ability: healthy, apparently cognitively intact, adults whose MRI scans 
indicate bilateral absence of the PCS are significantly less accurate in reality memory decisions than 
people with a prominent PCS on at least one side of the brain [41].  PCS reductions are typically 
associated with increased gray matter volume in surrounding anterior cingulate cortex [43] and, consistent 
with this observation, voxel-based analyses reveal that reality monitoring performance correlates 
negatively with medial PFC volume [41].  Reduced sulcal folding and increased surrounding cortical 
volume may reflect weakened local and long-range connectivity, according to theories of morphogenesis 
[44,45]. These findings thus suggest an explanation for individual differences in reality monitoring ability 
as reflecting, in part, variations in connectivity between the medial PFC and other cortical regions 
involved in processing the sensory-perceptual and other features that constitute our memories. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Reality Monitoring in Schizophrenia 
One of the applications of the work seeking to characterise the brain mechanisms of reality monitoring 
has been to inform understanding of the cognitive dysfunction seen in clinical conditions, such as 
schizophrenia. Although schizophrenia can vary in its presentation, among the positive symptoms often 
observed are hallucinations, such as hearing voices when none are present. For example, a person with 
schizophrenia might imagine a voice conveying a specific message, and misattribute that voice as real, 
coming from another person.  Hallucinations also occur in other psychiatric conditions including bipolar 
disorder, major depressive disorder, borderline or schizotypal personality disorder, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and dissociative identity disorder [46–48], but affect between 60 and 80% of patients with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis [49,50].  Auditory and visual hallucinations are the most common forms, with a 
prevalence of around 59% and 27% in schizophrenia, respectively [51], but olfactory, tactile, somatic, and 
gustatory hallucinations have also been reported [52–54].  Activity associated with hallucinations is often 
observed in sensory processing areas, such as the superior temporal gyrus during auditory hallucinations 
and extrastriate cortex during visual hallucinations [55], suggesting separable modality-specific 
impairments contribute to different types of hallucinations across patients.  One possibility is that 
hallucinations primarily reflect unusually vivid internally-generated experiences in one or more of these 
modality-specific representational areas, experiences that are so vivid that they seem to be external 
events.  Another (not necessarily mutually exclusive) possibility is that hallucinations may in part result 
from a more central difficulty discriminating between perceived and imagined information, perhaps 
because self-generated events have attenuated or missing records of the cognitive or motor operations that 
produced them [56].  
 
Despite the interpretational complexities inherent in studying such a heterogeneous syndrome as 
schizophrenia, a number of predictions have been tested that arise from the hypothesis linking disrupted 
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reality monitoring with hallucinations, and the assumption that some common processes are involved in 
distinguishing reality from imagination both retrospectively and in real time. One prediction is that 
individuals with schizophrenia should be impaired on the kinds of seen vs. imagined memory tasks that 
have been shown to elicit anterior PFC activity in healthy volunteers.  Of 20 studies of reality monitoring 
in schizophrenia surveyed for this article (see Table 1), involving a total of 700 patients and 505 controls, 
19 studies reported impaired reality monitoring in the patients, including four studies in which the deficit 
was found to be specific to reality monitoring, with item recognition memory being preserved [57–60].  A 
second prediction, if hallucinations result from misattributing imagined stimuli as real, is that an 
externalisation bias should be observed in schizophrenia during reality monitoring performance, with 
more errors on self-generated than externally-generated trials, and that this bias should be greater in 
patients with schizophrenia who experience hallucinations compared to those who do not.  Of the four 
studies reporting a specific reality monitoring impairment in schizophrenia, three noted that the deficit 
only (or disproportionately) involved the misattribution of internally-generated stimuli as having been 
externally-generated [58–60].  Furthermore, all five studies that compared reality monitoring in patients 
with and without hallucinations, and measured externalisation bias, observed a greater likelihood of 
misattributing internally-generated stimuli as real in the patients who experienced hallucinations [57,61–
64] (see also [65,66] for previous reviews highlighting such associations). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A third prediction is that the anterior PFC region activated in healthy volunteers during reality monitoring 
performance should be among the areas that are dysfunctional in patients with schizophrenia.  Consistent 
with this prediction, the anterior PFC region linked with reality monitoring in healthy volunteers overlaps 
closely [30] with one of the areas that consistently exhibit reduced activity in patients with schizophrenia 
compared with controls during performance of a range of cognitive tasks [67–71].  Moreover, lower 
anterior PFC activity in healthy individuals during reality monitoring correlates with proneness to 
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psychosis and schizotypal trait expression [37], an effect also observed in adolescents at risk of 
developing schizophrenia [72], suggesting its potential as a possible marker in young people of those with 
heightened likelihood of converting from prodromal to full psychosis [73]. 
 
A fourth prediction is that healthy volunteers who exhibit reduced levels of activity in anterior PFC 
should make more of the externalisation misattribution errors often observed in schizophrenia.  
Accordingly, analysis of activity in anterior PFC across participants during reality monitoring 
performance has revealed a significant negative correlation with the likelihood of mistakenly endorsing 
imagined items as having been seen [30]. A fifth prediction is that patients with schizophrenia should 
exhibit disproportionately reduced activity in anterior PFC during performance of reality monitoring 
tasks, an effect that has been reported in two studies to date [60,74], and which may be partly ameliorated 
by cognitive training interventions [74] (though this latter possibility requires replication in larger 
samples).  A sixth prediction, if hallucinations in schizophrenia are attributable to overstimulation of 
sensory processing areas and reality monitoring dysfunction, is that altered functional connectivity should 
be observed between posterior sensory cortices and anterior PFC.  Accordingly, several studies have 
reported impaired functional integration between superior temporal cortex and medial regions of anterior 
PFC associated with the misattribution by patients with schizophrenia of their own speech as that of 
somebody else [75,76]. Finally, based on the specific structural basis for reality monitoring identified in 
the PCS [41], hallucinations in schizophrenia should be associated with differences in PCS morphology, 
among other areas.  Providing support for this prediction, a quantitative measure of PCS length has been 
shown to be capable of distinguishing not only patients with schizophrenia from healthy controls [77], but 
also patients who have experienced hallucinations from patients with no history of such symptoms 
(Figure 3) [78].  The PCS reduction in patients with hallucinations appears to be evident irrespective of 
the sensory modality in which they were experienced (e.g., auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory), consistent 
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with the observation described above that healthy volunteers exhibit anterior PFC activity during reality 
monitoring regardless of the kind of stimuli being remembered [29,32,34,36]. 
 
Reality Monitoring and Hallucinations 
These findings provide evidence that reality monitoring impairment may be a key component of the 
cognitive basis for the hallucinations experienced by many patients with schizophrenia.  However, it is 
not only people with a mental health diagnosis who experience hallucinations.  Approximately 1% of the 
general population report hearing voices when no speaker is present, but do not seek professional help or 
receive a clinical diagnosis [79].  Phenomenally, the auditory hallucination experience tends to be similar 
in clinical and non-clinical voice hearers in terms of loudness, involvement of others’ voices, number of 
voices, and so forth, but can differ in frequency, duration, and content, with patients typically 
experiencing negative voices whereas non-clinical individuals are sometimes more likely to report neutral 
or pleasant content to their hallucinations [80–82].  Recent interest has focused on whether there might be 
a common neurocognitive basis for hallucinations in clinical and non-clinical groups.  If reduced reality 
monitoring ability is part of the explanation for the hallucinations observed in schizophrenia, can it also 
account for the symptoms experienced by non-clinical voice hearers? 
 
Evidence consistent with a common underlying mechanism comes from one study of reality monitoring 
in healthy volunteers which found that participants who were prone to experience hallucinations were 
more likely than other participants to misattribute self-generated words as having been spoken by the 
experimenter [83].  However, two more recent studies involving healthy individuals with a proneness to 
hallucinations found no evidence of an impairment in source or reality monitoring, or of an increased 
externalisation bias, in such non-clinical voice hearers [84,85].  Evidence from neuroimaging suggests 
common hallucination-related activity in auditory processing areas such as the superior temporal gyrus in 
clinical and non-clinical groups [86], and a correlation between non-clinical participants’ auditory 
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hallucination proneness scores and activity in superior temporal gyrus when imagining voices for items 
they subsequently misidentified as heard [87].  Clinical and non-clinical voice-hearers also have similar 
aberrant microstructure of the arcuate fasciculus connection between frontal and temporal cortices 
[88,89], but there is as yet no evidence as to whether hallucinations experienced by non-clinical 
individuals reflect the same pattern of anterior PFC dysfunction that has been observed in patients with 
schizophrenia.   
 
It may well be that there is more than one route by which hallucinations might occur in clinical and non-
clinical groups.  Hallucinations are sometimes experienced spontaneously in healthy individuals during 
periods of sensory deprivation [50], and auditory hallucinations can follow the onset of deafness [90] and 
visual hallucinations can occur following visual cortex injury [91].  These observations fit with the 
proposal that hyper-activation of sensory processing cortices might provide the perceptual content for 
hallucinatory experiences [92].  Consistent with this proposal is evidence that in healthy individuals 
during periods of silence there is spontaneous random activity in speech sensitive auditory processing 
areas within the superior temporal gyrus, along with associated activation in the anterior cingulate region 
of the medial PFC [93].  Thus, it is possible that a hallucination is initiated by spontaneous random 
activity in sensory processing areas, such as the superior temporal gyrus in the case of auditory 
hallucinations, reflecting spontaneous ‘inner speech’ and/or remembered speech, which may occur with 
greater intensity or frequency during periods of stress or heightened emotion [81].  In healthy individuals 
who do not experience hallucinations, such sensory activity may be correctly attributed as internally-
generated by reality monitoring processes supported by anterior medial PFC, and experienced as an 
imagined voice.  In patients with schizophrenia who experience hallucinations, spontaneous sensory 
hyper-activity may be even more intense, and accompanied by hypo-activation of medial PFC regions 
(consistent with studies of connectivity [75,76]) resulting in reality monitoring impairment, leading to a 
failure to recognise the activity as self-generated and to the experience of a hallucination.  In non-clinical 
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voice hearers, the spontaneous activity in sensory processing areas may either be of such intensity or be 
so unusual in character (perhaps due to emotional stress, trauma, or tiredness [81]), that an otherwise 
intact reality monitoring system fails to recognise the stimuli as generated internally and a sporadic 
hallucination is experienced.  A multi-factor model such as this [see also 92,94] can also explain why 
certain participant groups, such as older adults [95], people with developmental disorders such as autism 
[96], and healthy volunteers with bilateral PCS absence [41], may exhibit reductions in reality monitoring 
performance but do not apparently experience hallucinations.  These findings may be less compatible 
with single factor accounts, such as those involving prediction error [e.g. 97]. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
There is still much to discover about the brain mechanisms underlying reality monitoring, and the ways in 
which they may fail in health and disease, impairing the accuracy of judgments about what is real (see 
Outstanding Questions box).  Reality monitoring processes are fundamental for maintaining an 
understanding of the self as a distinct, conscious agent interacting with the world, perceiving and 
interpreting external information relating to events happening around us and generating our own thoughts 
and imaginations and responses.  Generally, people are able to keep the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ worlds 
distinguished sufficiently from one another to function under everyday circumstances but, occasionally, 
anyone may confuse real experiences with those they might have been told about or imagined or dreamt.  
Some individuals face a greater difficulty in reality monitoring, perhaps reflecting specific individual 
differences in the general population or, in more severe cases, dysfunction caused by neurological or 
psychiatric disease.   
 
The evidence from cognitive neuroscience research to date converges to suggest that the anterior PFC 
region of the brain is central to reality monitoring ability and disability.  It is a key component of brain 
networks that are engaged when distinguishing internally- and externally-generated information, and its 
disruption is associated with misattributions of reality, confusing internally-generated information as 
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having occurred in the outside world.  It appears to play an important, and previously underappreciated, 
role in the psychotic experiences that characterize disorders like schizophrenia.  The processes underlying 
reality monitoring are, like many higher cognitive functions, complex [9], but progress has been made by 
laboratories around the world in recent years leading to a greater understanding of the brain regions, 
especially anterior PFC, that subserve reality monitoring mechanisms.  An important next challenge will 
be to apply this knowledge to develop cognitive training techniques and other rehabilitation interventions 
aimed at enhancing the ability to distinguish real and imagined experiences in people whose sense of 
reality may be disturbed. Preliminary evidence suggests that such an approach might have potential 
[74,98], but researchers are just at the beginning of this road and there is much further work to do before 
it can be determined whether the potential is real. 
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Trends Box 
 Mounting evidence identifies anterior prefrontal cortex as playing a key role in reality monitoring, the 
ability to distinguish internally- from externally-generated information 
 Individual differences in reality monitoring performance in healthy volunteers are associated with 
variability in functional activity and structural morphology in this region of the brain 
 Differences are also seen in clinical conditions such as schizophrenia, in which people sometimes 
experience disturbed awareness of what is real 
 Dysfunction in anterior prefrontal cortex increases vulnerability to misattribute internally-generated 
information as external in origin, providing a possible neurocognitive basis for psychiatric symptoms 
such as hallucinations 
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Outstanding Questions Box 
Although much has been learned in recent years about the mechanisms of reality monitoring, and the way 
they may be impaired in neurological and psychiatric disorders, there is much still to be discovered.  In 
particular: 
 
 Which regional and interregional brain mechanisms, and related cognitive processes, might 
explain the intriguing observations that poor reality monitoring performance in healthy 
individuals is associated with reduced anterior PFC activity, but also with PCS reductions and 
greater volume of surrounding cortex? 
 
 What are the common and distinct components of neural activity associated with reality 
monitoring tasks requiring the distinction between self and other, and internal source monitoring 
between self-generated activities (e.g., imagined and performed)? 
 
 Do hallucinations experienced by non-clinical individuals without a psychiatric diagnosis reflect 
a similar pattern of anterior PFC dysfunction and reduced PCS length as observed in patients with 
schizophrenia?  Are similar functional and structural markers also present in prodromal 
individuals who subsequently progress to a diagnosis of schizophrenia? 
 
 What can explain the subjective differences between hallucinations typically experienced by 
patients with schizophrenia and by non-clinical individuals with a proneness to psychosis?  Why 
are some people with hallucinations fully aware that their experiences are erroneous perceptions, 
but others are not? 
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 Do the range of findings concerning hallucinations require a multiple factor explanation, or can 
they be explained as fully by more parsimonious single factor accounts, such as prediction error?   
 
 What are the similarities and differences in dysfunction in the brain mechanisms underlying 
reality monitoring processes that lead to hallucinations, confabulations, and delusions? 
 
 Can interventions that involve cognitive training, brain stimulation, or neurofeedback, be 
developed according to theoretical hypotheses about disrupted functions to improve reality 
monitoring ability and, if so, can they be demonstrated to reduce the incidence of hallucinations 
in people who experience them? 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1 
Three examples illustrating the variety of reality monitoring tasks and anterior prefrontal cortex activity 
elicited.  Top panel – memory for encoding task vs. stimulus size [34] (fMRI image courtesy of Ian G 
Dobbins, PhD). Middle panel – remembering whether words were seen or imagined [35] (fMRI image 
reprinted with permission from Elsevier). Bottom panel – distinguishing word pairs read aloud by the 
participant herself vs. the experimenter [37] (fMRI image reprinted with permission from MIT Press). 
 
 
Figure 2 
Locations of medial anterior prefrontal cortex activity reported by 12 fMRI studies of reality monitoring 
in healthy volunteers. 
 
 
Figure 3 
Paracingulate sulcus (PCS) and reality monitoring. Top panel – The PCS (shown in red), located in the 
medial PFC dorsal to the cingulate sulcus (CS), differs in length considerably between people (reprinted 
with permission from Nature Publishing Group).  Bottom left panel - Reduced reality monitoring 
performance in healthy volunteers in whom PCS absent in both hemispheres [41].  Bottom right panel – 
PCS length differentiates hallucination status in patients with schizophrenia, as well as distinguishing 
patients with schizophrenia from healthy control participants [78] (reprinted with permission for Nature 
Publishing Group). 
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Table 1: Studies of Reality Monitoring in Schizophrenia 
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